Alaska News • • 90 min
HJUD-260508-1300
video • Alaska News
Judiciary Committee will now come to order. The time is now 1:11 PM on Friday, May 8th, 2026. We are meeting in the Grunberg Room, Capitol Room 120. The following members are present: Representative Underwood, Representative Costello, Representative Mina, and myself, Representative Gray, Chair, and Representative Eishide. Let the record reflect that we have a quorum to conduct business.
I would like to recognize the staff supporting this meeting: Sophia Tenney from House Records, Zachary Lawhorn from the Juneau LIO, and Dylan Hitchcock Lopez, my committee aide. We have two items of business on today's agenda: House Bill 157, effective adoption decree on siblings, by myself, Representative Gray, and House Bill 367, Consumer Data Privacy Act, by Representative Andy Storey. Our first item of business is to bring back House Bill 157, effective adoption decree on siblings, up for its second hearing in our committee. At the last hearing, we introduced the bill and took up public.
Testimony, but held off on invited testimony because some of our testifiers were unavailable at that time. As a reminder, what this bill does is acknowledge the importance of sibling relationships. Right now in Alaska, if a group of foster sibling— if a group of siblings were to go into the system, the foster system, and be separated, and then were to be adopted by those families, they would become legal strangers to their siblings that got adopted into different households. This was an issue that was brought forward by Facing Foster Care in Alaska. They acknowledge the importance of sibling relationships and would like a change in the law.
This goal of the bill is to more accurately acknowledge the importance of existing sibling relationships and encourage the maintaining of those sibling relationships. We were joined by Representative Chuck Kopp at 1:13 PM. So we will now move to invited testimony. I'm going to ask committee members to hold their questions until after both of our invited testifiers. Our first invited testimony is from Amanda Mativier, Executive Director of Facing Foster Care in Alaska.
Ms. Mativier, please take yourself off mute, put yourself on the record, and begin your testimony.
Good afternoon. For the record, my name is Amanda Matevier, and I'm the Executive Director of Facing Foster Care in Alaska. I also have lived experience in the foster care system as a former foster youth, foster parent, adoptive parent, and relative caregiver. I'm testifying to ask for your support for House Bill 157. HB 157 was brought at the request of current and former foster youth across Alaska.
So our organization intentionally gathered input from foster youth, um, and those who are currently in the system and those who have recently transitioned out of care, um, throughout the state, and their message has been consistent in that sibling relationships are essential, and the physical and legal separation of siblings causes deep and lasting harm. HB 157 directly addresses that harm by ensuring that siblings remain legal siblings after adoption, even when adopted into different families. Adoption should be a moment of stability and, for many of us, celebration. But for many youth, it also brings grief in choosing one family over another. Alaska has already taken steps to keep siblings together.
FSCA helped pass earlier legislation requiring the state to make every effort to place siblings together in the same home, and then when that's not possible, to maintain meaningful contact. These aren't suggestions, they're statutory obligations. When the state removes children, keeping siblings together is a core duty, not an optional best practice. But too often siblings are separated simply because there aren't enough foster homes or relative caregiver options. So that shortage has only worsened in recent years.
When siblings are separated without cause beyond there was no foster home available, that's a systemic failure. And when the state fails to support sibling contact after that separation, that's also a systemic failure. And these failures fall on the system, not on the children and youth who have to bear the consequences. HB 157 strengthens the framework that we already have. It ensures that adoption does not erase the legal recognition of sibling relationships, and it requires the court to consider whether post-adoption contact is in the child's best interest.
This aligns with what youth want, what families want, and what best practice demands. This bill also complements the Indian Child Welfare Act. ICWA affirms that tribes determine who relatives are, including siblings. Regardless of adoption status. HB 157 aligns state law with that principle.
Budget and workload concerns are very real for frontline staff at OCS, but they do not relieve the state of its responsibility to preserve family relationships. And so I think a really important question too that kind of brought us to this, this bill and the drafting of this bill is how often is, is the state failing to keep siblings together under the current law? And if the answer is often, then the burden's not on young people in foster care to accept fewer rights. It's on the state to meet its existing obligations. HB 157 is youth-driven, and it's a necessary correction to a system that often fractures families.
So I urge you to support this bill, and I can also be available if there are questions. Thank you, Miss Mativier, for your testimony. Our next invited testifier is Barbara Malchik, board member of Facing Foster Care in Alaska. Ms. Malchik, please take yourself off mute, put yourself on the record, and begin your testimony.
Thank you. Can you hear me okay? Yes, we can hear you great. Okay, thanks. For the record, my name is Barbara Malchik.
I am on the board of directors of FFCA and have been since 2012. Prior to that, I was a guardian ad litem and supervising attorney with the Office of Public Advocacy representing the best interests of foster youth for over 25 years. I am testifying in support of HB 157. I need to mention that I am no longer a practicing attorney, so I can't actually give legal advice, but I can tell you what I know. From my years of practice and being actively involved with FSCA, I have heard the stories of literally thousands of foster youth, and I can tell you that their sibling relationship is the number one issue.
These youth can talk about what abuse they've suffered, how the system has treated them, and they can do it until you mention siblings and then the tears start flowing.
I listened to the past committee hearings, so both in HESS and in Finance, and it seems that everybody agrees with the spirit of HB 157 to recognize the importance of the relationship and to encourage all the people involved in the system to keep that relationship alive and well after adoption. The questions seem to focus on the rights of siblings and concerns about increased workload on, on OCS and maybe litigation around placement preferences and the definition of siblings. So, I'll try to address those. As to siblings' rights, as long as they're in custody, they have rights with respect to each other under the Child and Youth Aid Statute. So, the right to be placed together if possible, and if they aren't, then to get contact information about their siblings and to get visitation with them, unless it would be harmful to do so.
Under our current adoption law, as soon as one child gets adopted, other than the right to get contact information, the other rights disappear and the adopted sibling becomes a legal stranger to the siblings who are still in custody. And this has a profound effect on youth. HB 157 addresses the legal issue to say that siblings are no long— are not— are no longer legal strangers to their siblings. And I think this would certainly go a long ways psychologically for the youth, to assure both the siblings are getting adopted and the ones who are still in custody that their brothers and sisters are still considered under the law to be siblings. But we've learned over the course of these hearings that the HB 157 legal status would also impact placement preferences.
And we think this is a great thing for siblings. Please indulge me while I go into the weeds on the Child Need of Aid Placement Preferences, but I think it's important. They were enacted in an attempt to ensure that children who are removed from the parents can be placed in homes that allow them to remain connected with their families and with their culture. So, when a child comes into state custody, the first placement preference for that child is with what they call an adult family member. And that is defined in state law as grandparents, aunt and uncle, adult sibling, or the legal guardian or parent of the child's sibling.
Also, in ICWA cases, it would be the first placement preference is extended family as the tribe defines extended family. So, If HB 157 is passed, then an adult sibling who had been adopted then becomes one of the first placement preference options, along with relatives and along with adult siblings who had not been adopted out of the system. That's a good thing if the children have a good relationship. Also, a family that adopted a sibling would become another first preference option along with the others. And I note that OCF is not required to pick a specific adult family member.
It just— HB 157 would just broaden the options that are available to them. And since they already have information about these two new categories, I would think that would be an easier job for OCF, not a more difficult one.
There was— so children, when they're in custody, have the right to have visitation with each other.
Now, segueing into the post-adoption context, our current adoption law allows an adoption to be open. It's phrased in the double negative, so it says there's nothing here that prescribes.
Prohibited from being open. But, um, and that means that after adoption is complete, there can be visits with family members, um, or there's nothing to prohibit it.
And all— so there's nothing in HB 157 that mandates specific post-adoption contact between siblings, but there's some strong legislative intent language encouraging everybody involved in the child's case to recognize the importance of the relationship and to facilitate contact post-adoption. The only thing HB 157 does mandate in this regard is that judges include a best interest finding for children who were in state custody. So, they need to make a finding as to whether ongoing contact would be in the child's best interest. I think that's not going to be a hard thing to do. The child and youth of age statutes envision that the same the same judge who had been hearing the child need of aid case, probably for years, is also hearing the adoption case.
So the judge has all the information already to make the best interest finding. I also wanted to note that the child need of aid and adoption statutes have a mechanism for parents to preserve visitation when they voluntarily relinquish their rights so that the child can be adopted. And these are in writing. They're incorporated into the termination plan, and in turn are recommended to be incorporated in the adoption decree. So, sometime down the line, it's my fervent hope that we'll be able to adopt similar mechanisms for siblings to retain visitation rights.
We're not there yet. A lot of states, maybe even most states at this point, have the option. To include specific visitation in the adoption decree, and it would be worthwhile to look at those. They're all— they're very different from each other. So the other thing that was brought up in the other hearings was the definition of sibling and the concern about how broad it might be.
Um, in our statutes, the definition of sibling is different in different contexts, but we do support the broad definition of in HB 157 And think— so in addition to a sibling would be a sibling by blood, marriage, or adoption, also it would include the section that if a child has been raised with another child in a setting where they became like siblings, they'd be defined that way. I see it as a common sense definition. Siblings, especially in foster care, may have been raised in one home with the foster parents for many years and may consider the other children in the home to be their siblings. It would also include children who, prior to being in custody, they were in a home raised with the child of their parent's partner. And I think it's one of those things where you know it when you see it.
Ask the child, see their— who they consider their siblings, look at their relationship. I don't think it would be a difficult matter to do so.
I have plenty more to say if you have any questions. And I know at this late date in the session that there's really no chance of this bill passing. And I really look forward to being a part of ongoing discussions between the stakeholders to come up with something we can all agree with that will maintain the sibling relationship and not be overburdening to anybody. Um, thank you for your testimony, Ms. Malchuk, and we may have questions for you. I will just state that, um, there's always a chance for things to pass, so, um, I wouldn't say that it's too late.
Um, but, uh, I guess, um, I'll open it for questions from others. First, Representative Mina. Thank you, Chair Gray. Through the chair, uh, thank you, Miss Mochick, for your extensive testimony and for going through the previous hearings. So going back to what you had mentioned related to the different sibling rights as it exists in the Child in Need of Aid law, you mentioned the right to visitation.
Could I get those statutory references if you have them?
I do have them. Um, Usually I can just tell them off the top of my head, but I'm a little bit nervous, so I don't.
The visitation is— is in 47 Plan 080P.
[Speaker:DEBRA] So in that section, I'm not looking at it, but in that section, OCS is required to provide visitation between siblings who are— between the sibling and their families and parents. So that includes— so family includes siblings. [Speaker:KAYLA] Thank you. And just to follow up—. [Speaker:DEBRA] While they're in custody.
Thank you. And just to follow up, uh, the other sibling rights that you had mentioned under Child and Native Aid, so besides visitation, what were the other ones and do you have those references as well? I do. They have a right to receive contact information about their siblings and that is 4710 093, Subsection B, Subsection 16. And in that— so that section provides that OCS should give information, so as long as the children are in custody, to each other, but also sibling is defined in that section as also including a sibling who has been adopted.
So that OCS is required to provide contact information of the of the adopted child to the child who is still in custody. Okay, thank you.
And, well, the other one was, um, that OCS has to try to place siblings together, and that is 47.14.100 subsection R.
Thank you. Thank you. Any other questions?
I—. At ease.
The record, um, I would like to call forward Chrissy Vogeli from the Department of Family and Community Services and Nancy Mead.
Um, from the Alaska court system.
And I think we'll start with Ms. Mead. Uh, Ms. Mead, at a previous hearing you had stated the possible need for an additional hearing to, um, for the judge to decide if it was in the best interest of the child to maintain contact with the sibling. Ms. Malchik said that she believes that if the same judge has been hearing this case for potentially years, that the judge probably has all the information that they need in order to make that finding without an additional hearing. Can you just state why would there need to be a special hearing? For the record, Nancy Maid, General Counsel for the Alaska Court System.
It could be that there wouldn't be a special hearing, but when a statute requires a best interest finding, That's an important finding that needs to be made with all information presented. Somebody might have 5 siblings, um, some may have been adopted out before, uh, sometimes that judge can't be the adoption judge, though usually that's— every effort is made to do so. Uh, the judge doesn't just off the top of his or her head say, and I think it's good if you keep this relationship going. The parties would be briefing for each sibling why or why not it would be in their best interest. Now it's true that if a judge has a long history with the family and has dealt with every sibling in the family, uh, that might be short, but a best interest finding is an important thing.
It can be appealed. It is appealed. And so that would not be an unserious or flip finding that the judge needs to make. So there would be likely a hearing on that in many cases. Okay, thank you for that.
Um, I'm going to ask the question to Ms. Mativier and to Ms. Malchek about, um, when I initially envisioned the bill.
I wasn't thinking that we needed to do a deep dive into whether or not the, um, we needed to find a, I guess, an official best interest finding. I really wanted to encourage the adoptive parents to continue the relationship if the adoptive parent thought it was a good idea. So in other words, not leaving it to the court to decide, but leaving it to the adoptive parent to decide. And just giving the flexibility if the parent had a few meetings and it didn't go well, then the parent can decide not to continue, you know, just really because again, we were trying not to issue new mandates but to just really, uh, encourage as best we could for these to continue. I guess, can you speak to whether or not we should— it would be okay to amend the language so that we definitely don't have to have an additional hearing?
And I guess I'll start with Ms. Metivier.
Can you hear me? Yes. Okay, again, for the record, Amanda Metivier, Facing Foster Care.
Well, there's a few things I think that happen now that Ideally, in practice, the courts and OCS and the potential adoptive family are all working together to navigate family contact. So, children in care should have a family contact plan already that says siblings are visiting each other, or if for whatever reason that's not a safe thing, they're not, right? And that's documented. So, ideally, long before you get to the adoption hearing, some of that's already happening and those conversations are happening at play. I personally know I know a young person right now who's 14 who comes from a large sibling group and is separated from all siblings.
It's a sibling group of 8. And this is a 14-year-old who— at a certain age, youth get to consent. They decide if they want to be adopted or not. They have to give consent. And this is a child who's struggling on whether or not they should join this family through adoption or not, because it's gonna make them a legal stranger to their sibling, right?
It's gonna sever those ties. Still has contact, still is, you know, having those relationships. Sometimes the adoptive parents and OCS can't figure that out, and it can be healthy to have that conversation before a judge, right, or the judge to facilitate some of that. I don't know if Barb has a different answer, but again, a lot of this should be playing out in practice long before you get to the stage of the adoption hearing. [Speaker:MARK] Thank you for that.
And before we go to Ms. Malchik, I just wanted to state that in the same way that the judge, in most cases, who's— if you have the same judge all the time, the judge is usually familiar with the family situation, because as the foster parent who has been taking kids to all these different meetings, the foster parent is also aware of the siblings and how they get along, and those in most— in a lot of cases, I'd say. So I'm thinking in some ways we have sort of like the most common case and then probably some outlier cases where, you know, it's a sibling that they haven't had any contact with during this 18-month foster period. But I guess, Ms. Malchuk, can you speak to whether there's room to amend this to avoid an additional hearing?
Yes, am I off mute? Yes, we can hear you. Okay, again, for the record, Barbara Melchik from SFCA. I think that the situations that Ms. Mead outlined are the outliers, at least in my pretty lengthy career, and that if there really is an issue about whether ongoing contact is in the child's best interest, then maybe there needs to be a hearing. It may alert the child, as Ms. McTavish said, children over time need to consent.
To an adoption. And they need to understand that if all parties aren't agreeing that it's in the child's best interest to continue contact, that maybe it's not the right adoptive home for them. In some states— I've been looking at their laws on all this— is that if adoptive parents are not going to allow ongoing contact, that is a ground to deny the adoption petition. So, I think it's an important finding that the judge needs to make. I think that in the vast majority of cases it will be a simple finding to make and that in some cases there will be hearing and in the end that may be a good thing to flush everything out.
Thank you.
Representative Costello. Thank you. I think it's an important discussion. My question is if If there's a best interest finding bar to have to, you know, satisfy, do you have to have a separate hearing just for that or not?
Through the chair to Representative Costello, it might be along with another hearing that's set. It might be at the adoption hearing itself that this topic is discussed if the statute requires it. So, whether it's a separately set hearing or an additional topic discover— or discussed at a hearing that was already set for a certain time, it can go either way. But the best interest finding, I would say, you know, the best interest factors are set out in statute and they are followed. If a judge doesn't mention every one, that's an appeal point.
It's very particular.
And, you know, these cases are sometimes contentious, and so the best interest finding is not a simple thing at all. It has to be followed to the T, or— because they are the party's rights, and so it could happen in another hearing, or it could be separate. [Speaker:DR. BETHANY BRADSHAW] Could we amend it so that we require that this best interest finding is in concert with another hearing that's already scheduled? Because I, I mean, I'm understanding from the conversation that you want to avoid the fiscal note. I suppose I'm just throwing that out there.
Well, can I, can I just add something?
I think we don't have any teeth. So in other words, let's say the judge does the best interest finding, says it's in the best interest for this child to remain in contact with these 3 siblings who are in another household. And the parent says, "Yeah, I'm not going to do that." This bill is not addressing that. So do you know what I'm saying? So in a way, why are we going to go through all this work to have this extra hearing to say that we're going to really do a deep dive and, and come to a conclusive finding that it's in the best interest for this child to maintain the relationship when we're not going to mandate that the parents maintain that relationship?
So Ms. Mead. So if, if that's what you're looking for, to the chair, one suggestion might be that in an adoption decree for a child who is in state custody, and I'm looking at your Section 2, the adoption decree shall include, uh, some recommendations from the Office of Children's Services, who knows it best, or something like that. We can, you know, about whether continued sibling contact is advisable. And then it's always up to the adoptive parent, right, what to do with their child, which is now their child. So you— there could be just, you know, there, there should be some findings as to whether the contact would be beneficial, but best interest of the child is, is much stricter than whether it might be a good thing.
Thank you. So I guess, uh, to Ms. Fogaly, um, would that be considered a big burden on an OCS caseworker to provide feedback as to whether or not the child should maintain contact with siblings after adoption?
To the chair, for the rec— is this on? Sorry, okay. To the chair, for the record, this is Chrissy Vogeli, Senior Policy Advisor for the Department of Family and Community Services. [Speaker:MEGAN_FAULKNER_BROWN] So throughout the course of the child in need of aid proceedings, the caseworker when at court, you know, these things I think are hashed out during the child in need of aid proceedings. If you do have siblings who are separated and in different foster placements, I mean, those sort of findings would be made throughout the course of the case simply because you would be want— you would want to monitor that to ensure that that contact is still beneficial to both of the children.
And I'm so sorry if I missed it.
Is it a big burden or not? If it was an issue for, you know, at sort of the end of the case when you're looking at permanency, I would want to say that it is not a big burden simply because those findings should have been made throughout the course of the case. I might want to follow up, though, with Office of Children's Services and get back to you on that one. [Speaker:JOSH TAYLOR] I mean, again, I'll just share from my personal experience working through the system. I know that our social workers could have easily made a comment on this because they've been dealing with the families for a long time.
—It doesn't require a lot of extra thought. They're like, "Oh yeah, he and his sister love each other, they should see each other frequently," like, my opinion, and that's what we were asking for, is just the caseworker to give their opinion. Ms. Malchik, did you want to respond?
Yes, just briefly, thank you. Barbara Malchik for the record. I was just looking at the adoption rule number 14, and there are a number of findings that the judge needs to make at the conclusion of the court hearing, and one of them is whether the adoption is in the best interest of the minor. So they're already making a best interest and consider— can consider any factor, including ongoing contact. And another finding, number 7, is whether visitation rights are being allowed under the open adoption statute or provision.
So, I mean, there, there are a bunch of findings that the judge needs to make, and I don't think that the one regarding ongoing contact with siblings is any more difficult than the other ones, except in outlier cases. Miss Mead? Uh, well, you know, lawyers can look at things differently, can't they? I would just say that some of these families have many siblings. What if a sibling, um, somebody is about to be adopted and the older sibling has substance abuse issues, or may have a juvenile delinquency record, or may have worse things going on in the family.
Yes, the judge makes a decision that it's in the best interest of this child to be adopted with this family, but it's a whole different decision whether to decide whether that older teenager, you know, may have a detrimental effect on that child. So if visitation were to continue, so I would say it's nuanced, but there would be additional discussion for certain. Thank you. I'll just add to that, that let's say, for example, a a 12-year-old is being adopted and that 12-year-old has a 16-year-old sister, and at the time of the adoption, you know, that 16-year-old sister doesn't have a substance abuse issue and the finding is that they should continue contact, but then the next year she does. Well, then the adoptive parent decides that at this time it's not in the best interest of my now 13-year-old to have a lot of contact with this particular sibling because it's a bad influence, or etc., the adoptive parent can make that decision.
And so I think, you know what I mean, like, I don't want to, like, overstate the, you know, the amount of work that should go into this opinion. And I guess, like, maybe— and I'm not a lawyer, so maybe we can amend it— but I think Ms. Vogely has said that if we just, you know, we just change it so that the caseworker offers the opinion, that, you know, that might be a way so that we're not accidentally creating an extra hearing.
Through the chair, that makes some sense to me. Um, Ms. Malchek, does that sound okay to you?
That makes sense to me as well, um, but I stand by what I said earlier as well. Okay. Thank you. Representative Mena. Thank you, Chair Gray.
Through the chair, um, I think maybe this question might be for Ms. Voogtley. So just to clarify from this discussion right now, we could amend the bill so that the caseworker could provide that input during the actual adoption proceedings where the findings from the child in need aid hearings could be considered as the recommendation during adoption. I, I just want to make sure I'm getting that correct. Through the chair to Rep. Mena, I believe that is where we're going, yes.
Okay, then a follow-up. So my understanding is, going back into, I believe, what Ms. Melchik referenced, AS471080, within the child in need of aid statute, they— there definition of sibling is different from what's currently in the bill. And so what I'm trying to figure out is, since you have a broader definition in the current bill, there could still be potentially other siblings that wouldn't have been considered in child in need of aid hearings. Is that correct? Through the chair, Director Mena, yes, that would be correct.
So just one follow-up slash comment: if we're trying to help streamline the process so we don't have to we're trying to mitigate additional hearings, it seems like we would also— there might be an interest to have the definition of sibling be the same as it is in child in need of aid statute, whatever we decide what that definition is. Thank you. Um, to Representative Mena, I'll just say that the way I framed it in my head is that we have two choices. Either we can remove what I feel is the, the, the absolute meat of the bill, which is that they remain legal siblings, um, after adoption. Or, and we— in which case, if we do that, if— or we change the— we drastically reduce Section 4 and the definition.
So in other words, um, if we're, if we're going to keep them legal siblings after adoption, then I think we do need to change the definition of sibling. However, if we're not, if for some reason we decide that there's too many unintended consequences or too many potential extra mandates that would be raining down on OCS and the court system if we kept them legal siblings after the adoption, then I think it would be okay to have a very broad definition of sibling after the adoption, because if we're avoiding all mandates, then I love the fact that a child who's spent the first 10 years of their life in the same bedroom, perhaps, with another kid that was not related to them by blood or marriage, but to that child, they feel that it's their sibling, that we are recognizing that in some way. And I think that it's good that it's not existing in other parts of statute. And I like that part of the bill. So, you know, and it's almost like, I feel like a question for invited testimony, you know, what's more important, uh, doing sort of the heavier lift of making this legal after adoption, this legal relationship continues after adoption, or can we try to find a way around that but accomplishing the goal of maintaining these relationships even though we will be expanding the definition of sibling quite broadly?
And so I guess that's a question for both Ms. Metivier and Ms. Malchik.
Amanda Metivier again, for the record. I, um, I think that the expanded definition of sibling is something that youth already recognize. And so, I understand, like, mirroring things for state statute, but for children that already fall under ICWA, the tribe's going to determine who family is. And I've actually experienced this in my own personal life. I grew up with a foster family, and their daughter is someone that I considered my sister.
And her son landed in foster care, and the tribe then identified my husband and I as a first preference placement under ICWA as her sibling. I aged out of that foster home. That family didn't adopt me or do a guardianship. I think we need to do the same for non-Native young people. Because again, right, youth are experiencing all these broken relationships in the system, and I think when we take away some of these, like, labels, right?
It actually expands who their family is, but it recognizes who they believe their family is too, and that's really what youth want as a part of this.
Thank you. I think what I will just add to what Ms. Mativier said is that when I read Section 4, I, I really wanted to be clear that the type— the, the sibling relationships that we wanted to preserve were the existing sibling relationships at the time, uh, that they went into the system. And so there is a little bit of vagueness about this definition where you could have a sibling by blood that did not grow up in the same house with you, that you do not have a relationship with, that that the child doesn't even know. And the goal of the bill is not to make that relationship happen. The goal was to preserve existing relationships.
And I think I say that out loud as sort of, I want to make the changes to make that happen because that's where I think OCS, I could be wrong, but I think that's where OCS gets really nervous that they might have to try to somehow find new siblings, you know, or find siblings that aren't even a part of the child's life. Or, as has been brought up before, find new siblings as they're born, that if we're not careful— I see the, um, the look of perplexion— like, if, if a child is adopted and their birth mother gives birth to a new baby after the adoption, well, by.
Is related to an individual by blood, well, that, that the child who's been adopted is related to that new baby by blood.
And if this bill were to pass exactly as it is today, they would be legal siblings. And what does that mean? And, and, and I don't— the goal of the bill is not to do that. So I do want to clarify that in the bill. I guess, Miss Vogely?
Yeah, can I address that? Yes. Um, So to the chair, again for the record, Chrissy Vogelie, Senior Policy Advisor of the Department of Family and Community Services. Um, the department understands the intent of the bill. I don't believe that there's anything in this bill that would mandate OCS to go and find other siblings and ensure contact.
That would not be up to OCS. The concern that we have with the bill is more that placement preference and that the new adoptive parents, if they aren't already relatives of the children, they then become a placement preference that could, you know, that interf— or what's the word I'm looking for, I'm sorry, that maybe conflicts with some of the actual blood relatives or tribally recognized relatives. So, and with that, if there are conflicts, you know, the, those relatives like grandparents and whatnot, they can come forward and request placement review hearings based off of that. So that is really where the concern comes in, and that is, that is an extra hearing that wouldn't be able to be mitigated through any other process. Thank you.
And I guess my follow-up question on that issue is that wouldn't the sibling group have been attempted to be placed together with that family from the beginning? And for whatever reason, they said they could only take 3 siblings, not 4. And so when those 3 are being adopted without that 4th, the fear that suddenly they become a preferred placement for that 4th— well, that's already kind of been addressed. That family was not able to take the fourth sibling, and maybe they've changed their mind. And in which case I would think, well, then that's a good thing.
And when you say, well, like, oh, well, they're going to have equal placement to the grandparents. Well, the grandparents should have been asked first already. So, I mean, I, again, there could be some outlier situations where suddenly a grandparent is a good placement and they weren't a good placement before. But I think in a lot of cases, because we're not talking about a random person who's suddenly become a preferred placement, but somebody who was considered as a foster placement in the beginning, I'm just not sure that it's going to be that, that much of a conflict. To the chair, I would say, you know, there could be different grandparents involved with different siblings due to half siblings and things like that.
So, you know, I think that sure, maybe it's an outlier situation, but these situations do arise and they are difficult to navigate. I would also mention, you know, this concept too that siblings, you know, they get separated while in the foster care system, they are placed in different homes. Foster care is temporary. The number one goal is reunification with their parents. It is not for those foster parents to adopt 3 of the siblings and different foster parents to adopt 3 more.
That is not what we work towards at all. And if it is the case that the biological parents are unable to modify their behaviors in order to have their children back, you know, OCS does still look for adoptive parents who— I mean, number one priority would be a relative who could take the entire sibling group. So just follow up, if we put in the bill that the adoptive parents of the siblings will not be a preferred placement, would that allay OCSS fears that this might somehow conflict with a grandparent, making sure that we don't have any conflicts with future grandparents that enter the picture? Potentially. I think we would have to review the language and, you know, and make sure that everything would be smooth.
Thank you. Ms. Metivier or Ms. Malchik, do you have a comment?
This is Barbara Malchik. Can I Am I unmuted? Yes.
Okay. Can I go back to your original question about the definition, the either/or that you proposed? Yes. Okay. It's an interesting question because in my view of other states' post-adoption contact laws, it gets written differently.
They don't—. And I think this— you had answered a question, Rep. Gray, in one of the prior hearings about about if any other states had gone the legal route to say they're no longer legal strangers, and none of them have that I could find either. But the way they frame their statutes are the legal right that they are giving to the sibling is the right to have post-adoption contact. And so, you know, it's possible that you're either/or, the or where with a broad definition of siblings, keeping the concept of legal stranger, which is just an awful explanation and pushes a lot of buttons for you, but giving them the right to have certain contact and contact with their siblings post-adoption. And it's a complicated process to get there, and I say this because each state seems to have a very different way of phrasing it, but it's all meant to the same end, which is to have contact posted options.
Thank you. Did that make sense? Okay, Miss Mead, no? Oh no, I did not need to talk is what my head shake was. Um, are there any other questions for our invited testimony or for our, um, resources in front of us?
Representative Mena? Chair Gray, uh, through the chair, I think maybe this question is for Ms. Matyviar. So just from hearing Ms. Melchik talking about comparing post-contact adoption laws in other states with siblings, if the bill achieved a goal that encouraged but not mandated the new adoptive parents with the decree to encourage sibling contact, but the bill didn't legally recognize those siblings, would that still meet the goal of the bill as intended?
Um, I would actually have to think about that a bit. Um, so, and if it would impact, um, I guess other existing requirements for contact. So there was a previous legislation that passed that requires— or that requires the department to give siblings each other's contact information when they're in custody. And I just worry if we add other language that would only encourage it for those that are then post-adoption, if that would untangle something. So, um, yeah, I think I have to think about it a little bit more.
I don't have an answer offhand. Thank you. Um, Representative—. Uh, Ms. Mead, uh To the chair, on a slightly different topic, but one complicator in the bill that I notice is Section 3 applies to children who are adopted out of state custody and every other adoption that is done in the state of Alaska. So a private adoption that somebody arranges, uh, when somebody is, uh, having a, an infant and is unable to take care of them for whatever reason, and a private family arranges for that adoption that is covered by Section 3, and I don't know if that was the intent to keep a legal relationship going, which might be very complicated for some of those families.
Thank you for highlighting that. We will need to fix that language. This is, this is a bill that should be about OCS custody and not about private adoptions.
Any other questions about HB 157 at this time? I think what I'll just say out loud, what I think is that, um, I'm going to do a lot of thinking. I—.
And Ms. Mativier, you can just correct me if I'm wrong, but when we started talking about this at the very beginning, our goal was to just do something very simple, which make it so that after an adoption, the child becomes a legal, uh, becomes a legal stranger to their biological family except for siblings. That's what we wanted to do. And it was going to be very meaningful and we, we loved it and and that we were just going to have a statement from the judge that this child has existing legal siblings that this court recognizes that may be in the best interest of the child to continue those relationships. And, you know, I guess, like, what I'm thinking is that, like, if we go the route of trying to make sure that nothing else is possible, well, that's not really what we want to do. But if we allow everything that's possible to happen, Well, then, you know, we need a year to work on the bill.
So I just think we have to figure out like how narrow do we want to go to just be making a statement? Or do we want to go broad but acknowledge that this will take a lot more time?
Ms. Mativier.
Amanda Mativier, Facing Foster Care. I think it's worthwhile to take time to be thorough. So, yes, the original intent was to consider siblings legal siblings, right, and not legal strangers after they're adopted separately. But then what does that mean to have a legal relationship after adoption? Is that required or encouraged contact?
And looking toward, like, what is in the best interest of the youth and all these various different dynamics and situations. And so, I think it makes sense to take time to really do this in a meaningful way. A lot of states have tackled this in different ways through things like a sibling bill of rights, or as Ms. Malchik alluded to, all the sort of like varying definitions of sibling and statute. And I think it would be ideal if— I mean, we at FSCA would be happy to come together and bring youth forward for a conversation with anyone at the department level and the courts to kind of figure out maybe in the interim over a longer period of time, like, what's the best way to do that so it's not overly burdensome for OCS but it's still protecting youth rights if they're adopted into other families? And this is happening more and more often with our shortage, right, of foster homes and turnover and all the things that kind of lead into sibling separation.
I just wanted to clarify that, that we had a zero fiscal note on this bill. The extra hearings would not be terribly burdensome when and if they occur in these cases, and The court system does recognize all those statutes about what usually, often, contact with siblings, well, when appropriate, is in the best interest of the child. So I'm happy to work on something that, that makes a little bit, um, makes this a little bit more streamlined and maybe avoid some of the pitfalls that this may have brought up. That's all.
Thank you. Um, in spite of Ms. Mativier saying that we were going to, uh, work on this in the interim, I, I'm still going to set an amendment deadline, and I'm going to submit— I'm going to suggest an amendment deadline that is actually later than what my staff suggested. Um, so I'm going to set an amendment deadline for HB 157 for Thursday, May 14th, 2026, at 5 PM. Please work with my committee aide to ensure that the amendments are submitted on time. That gives us a whole week to talk to folks and see if there's a way that we can find a way forward to make the bill workable now, um, and, uh, we'll set House Bill 157 aside now and bring it up at a later date.
Thank you, Miss Vogeli, Miss Mead, Miss Malchuk, and Miss Metivier. Oh, and we did have Margaret Bergerud on. Thank you for being online from Ledge Legal for any questions. I appreciate that, and I apologize that we did not ask you any questions. Um, our next item of business is HB 367, Consumer Data Privacy Act, sponsored by Representative Story.
At this time, I would like to invite the sponsor, Representative Story, and her staff, Kaylee Holm, to the witness table. I would note for the record that an amendment deadline on House Bill 367 was set for Thursday, May 7th, 2026, at 5 PM, and our office received 4 amendments. Are there any comments from the sponsor before we take up amendments. [Speaker:KAREN] Thank you, Chair Gray and members of the committee. It's good to be here today.
Just appreciate you bringing the bill up again. I think it is really important to know when Alaskans have the right to know when their personal data is being collected. So I appreciate you looking at the bill. [Speaker:CHAIR_GRAY] Thank you.
At this time, I will move Amendment Number 1.
You wouldn't object? I will object for purposes of discussion. Thank you. So Amendment Number 1 basically creates what is perhaps would be considered a typo on page 8, line 3, changing the word 'and' to 'or.' If people want to find it.
Do you want to speak to the amendment, Representative Story? Thank you, Chair Gray. I consider this a friendly amendment. Thank you. Do you maintain your objection?
I remove my objection. Thank you. Hearing and seeing no other objections, Amendment 1 has been adopted. I move Amendment 2. I object for purposes of discussion.
Thank you, Representative Mena. So Amendment 2 adds some language from a bill that was recently passed in Utah, and we pulled it directly from the bill in Utah. And the way this language came about in Utah was there was concern that because the technology develops so quickly and changes so much, they wanted some language in there that basically would provide protections that beyond, like, whatever the technology today might be. And I guess I might call my staff, Dylan Hitchcock Lopez, forward to expand because I've said all I can say. About Amendment 2.
Good afternoon. Dylan Hitchcock Lopez, committee aide. So, yeah, as— through the chair, as Chair Gray said, this language is called the duty of loyalty language, and it was taken from a Utah act that just passed this session related to state-endorsed digital identities. And so it's a slightly different context, but it's falls within the rubric of individual privacy rights, consumer protection. The idea of having a duty of loyalty as a backstop right in the consumer data privacy context is borrowed from the version— the historical ideas of the duty of loyalty, which comes mostly from the fiduciary context.
We see this with lawyers, financial professionals, the idea being that in certain arenas where there's an inherent imbalance of power between, you know, one side of the equation and the other, whether it's through the professional relationship or it's because of just the nature of the industry. So in this case, the idea being that because the companies that aggregate the data, that sell the data, that control how we interact with the data have a disproportionate kind of bargaining power vis-à-vis the consumer and also because the technology does move very rapidly. Historically, I think we heard some of this from invited testimony from Consumer Reports at the very first hearing on this bill, but historically, America has gone with what is called a notice and choice model when it relates to consumer privacy, where— which has resulted in, as many of us know, just having to click through lots of little screens where we consent to basically whatever the company asks us to consent to. This bill remedies that in many, many ways by providing specific consumer rights, but The idea of having a duty of loyalty is that there are general principles that basically say that, you know, if the company has on the one hand the option of doing something that is profitable, that is very clearly not in the best interest of the consumer, and they choose to do that, that does create an actionable right for the consumer. So it's meant to be a malleable concept.
It's not meant to define. Everything. The bill already sets out many explicit rights. It is just to try to move towards more of a model where consumers, again, have a backstop akin to a fiduciary duty where the company has to take the privacy interests and the best interests of the consumer into consideration when making decisions about what to do with their data. Thank you.
Representative Story, do you have any comments about Amendment 2? Uh, if it is the will of the committee, I'm neutral on the amendment. Thank you. Um, any questions about the amendment?
I, I have a question, uh, through the chair to, uh, Mr. Hitchcock Lopez. So the duty of loyalty is in, uh, Utah law that has passed. Could you tell me more about the Utah law? Yeah, so through the Chair to Representative Mina. So Utah Senate Bill 275, which is the state-endorsed digital identity law, which was enacted this session and goes into effect in— actually went into effect on May 6th, so just a couple days ago.
So it's from a slightly different context. It relates to the proliferation of I'm kind of blanking on the term now, but, you know, where you have essentially your identification on your phone or through an app, or, you know, there are ways of having kind of, you know, your passport or your driver's license or different forms of identification stored digitally. That's a pretty unregulated space historically. And so what Utah has enacted here is basically having a state-endorsed digital identity that is governed by statute that has built-in safeguards to ensure that, you know, the citizens have digital identity rights without kind of running the risk of losing all control over what is often sensitive identifying data. I don't have deep, deep knowledge about that law, but in where I think the specific crossover here and why we looked to the data,.
The duty of loyalty as enacted in that law is because the common thread here is identifiable personal data. That's the thing that we are looking to safeguard here, the identifiable personal data of the consumer. And so that is where the crossover between the two laws, I think, is sort of most apropos of this conversation and where the duty of loyalty sort of segues. And I would say that— and happy to provide it to the committee. The— actually, the drafters of the Utah law looked specifically to a law review article written by, actually, a former professor of mine, Neil Richards.
They called it "A Duty of Loyalty for Privacy Law," which was published a number of years ago. And so, you know, we looked to that law review article as well that was used by the Utah drafters. And sort of to kind of make sure that it was in accordance with the broad concepts that we're trying to put forward here in, um, the, the bill at hand.
Thank you. I guess maybe this might be for the bill sponsor through the chair. Is— are the— this duty of loyalty, these parameters that are in there, is— are components of this in the bill already? Like, is it duplicative, or does it create— I know you're neutral, but is duplicative, or does it create another additional layer of protection for consumers? Through the Chair, uh, to Rep. Mena, uh, to me, this, uh, duty of loyalty does not change the overall goal of You know, giving Alaskans meaningful, meaningful control over their personal data.
So I do not see any harm in it. May strengthen it, actually. Thank you. I remove my objection. Representative Costello.
I have a question, probably for the drafter. So if you enumerate in statute what a controller may not perform, Does that mean that if you do not enumerate something, that they can perform those things that are not enumerated? Um, Mr. Hitchcock Lopez, thank you. Through the chair to Representative Costello, the intent certainly is that, um, this would be the, the things that a controller may not perform over and above the things that are already enumerated that they also can't perform in the bill. And so in this sort of relates to Representative Mina's question before, which is, you know, to a certain extent, this is a little bit duplicative of the rights that are enumerated.
It is, in fact, supposed to be because the specifically enumerated rights that have to do with notice, that have to do with when things can be sold, about when things can be communicated, those are great, but we know that this technology is so rapidly evolving that it's not that hard for us, I think, to envision a situation where —a controller, you know, the person who is determining the parameters of how the data is collected and sold, could be in technical conformity with the letter of the law, but could still be then taking actions that, say, result in disproportionate risk to an individual. Perhaps they are holding people's consumer data for unreasonably long lengths of time, and then have, you know, are saying that they're doing it for product development or for, you know, other purposes that would be legitimate business purposes under the act, and then that data gets stolen and forms of a data breach, this would allow the consumer to then say, you know, and a court ultimately to scrutinize, was the behavior and action of that controller, though technically allowable, in violation of the duty of loyalty because it created that disproportionate risk? So it is meant to be additive in addition to the enumerated rights in the bill.
A follow-up? Yes. A new question. So the way this is written, it says a controller may not perform an activity related to collection, processing, or transfer. Why— why that instead of a controller may not collect, process, or transfer?
Through the Chair, so instead of saying "in a way that the controller may not collect, process, or transfer personal data in a way that," as opposed to right now, I think that, through the Chair, it might just be a drafting question for the— and I don't believe Mr. Walsh from Ledge Legal is online, but I think that that is maybe just a question of grammar that goes to the Ledge Legal's drafting manual.
May I make a comment while we're waiting? I mean, it seems to me that if we— what we're saying here is an activity related to collection, processing, or transfer. Not— instead, you know, why aren't we saying, "May not collect, process, or transfer"? What is "related to"? What does that mean?
Through the chair. And the sponsor of the amendment may be open to a conceptual amendment to craft some of that language. I think that the intent behind it was, again, to be intentionally capacious, to say, you know, that even if you're not— even if your behavior is not technically related to the act of collecting, processing, or transferring, but maybe it's— and I am, in all fairness, struggling to kind of think through what that might be, but, you know, you have— the controller can't say, well, I wasn't actually collecting the data. I was just— these are just solicitations and advertisements about ways in which I'm going to collect the data, or sort of trying to really split a hair. This would still cover that because it's related to the collection.
So I think it's meant to be a little bit more broad than just the specific verbs. But I think that I could see that being an argument either way. [Speaker:ERIC] I think it's a question for the probably for Ledge Legal, because I think probably related to includes collecting, processing, transferring personal data. It just goes a little bit beyond that. In my mind, I was trying to think of hypotheticals.
I know that for me and probably many people in this room, you know, there are apps on my phone that have my routing number and my bank account number. It's how I pay for lots of things. From rideshares to, you know, I'm using those. And so to my mind, I think knowing that there's lots of technology that has my routing number and my bank account number, I could see how that could result in the way that that data is being processed could result in a disproportionate risk to me and others if somehow, you know, it wasn't safe and it was— and then, you know, you could lose a lot of money. I guess I'm just thinking about ways that the language here is designed to try to give somebody a, you know, in a future unforeseen circumstance, some recourse to the company to say you weren't allowed to put me at risk in this way.
You weren't allowed to to use my data to cause this kind of harm. Um, and we've stated it clearly, although I don't know if related is, is making it clear or not. So I appreciate the question from Representative Costello, but— and to the chair— but I'm afraid to take it out. I'll just say I'm afraid to remove it because if the intent is to make it broader, I'd want to keep it in.
And to the chair, I could step out and ask— let's see— to call in. Okay, I'm at ease.
Back on the record. Staff to Representative Story will offer an explanation while we get Ledge Legal on the phone. For the record, Kaylee Holm, staff to Andy Story, Representative Andy Story. I think what it is, is in the bill, it already explains how data can be used, how data can be sold, how data can be shared. And so the questions of why it's related to and not just stating this is how you can do it is because that is captured in the bill, and it would— there's where the redundancy would come in, and it could also in some points conflict.
Thank you. Aris.
Back on the record, we have Ian Walsh, Legislative Counsel, Legislative Legal Division, Legislative Affairs Agency, on the line. I will relay the question. So, Mr. Walsh, we're talking about Amendment 2 to House Bill 367, and the question is about the choice of, in line 4, of saying "related to" as opposed to— rather than saying a controller may not collect, process, or transfer personal data, why are we using the terminology "an activity related to"?
For the record, this is Ian Walsh, Legislative Legal Services. Chair Gray, I think we could draft that either way. Um, we would need to say if we were going to go in the manner that you're proposing, I think the amendment could say something like, controller may not collect, process, or transfer personal data in a manner that, uh, and then I would probably have to make conforming changes to the rest of the paragraphs, some of them at least, to conform to that change. Um, But, yeah, I think it could be drafted either way, and I am not sure why that particular phrasing was used. It perhaps might have related to the materials that were provided with the request, but I couldn't say for sure.
[Speaker:MATTHEW ZIEGELBAUM] Mr. Walsh, I don't think we have a strong feeling either way. What we wanted to make sure is that an activity related to does capture collecting, processing, or transferring personal data.
[Speaker:ANDREW_HART] Chair Gray, that's correct. I think related to is a pretty broad modifier. So it says an activity related to, I think that would broadly capture basically anything that the controller might be doing that relates to the collection, processing, or transfer of personal data. So in some sense, it's possible that the amendment as drafted is a little broader. Than the version that I was sort of coming up with earlier.
Thank you. I guess to Representative Costello, do you feel comfortable with related to? I'm fine with the way it's written. I now have another question though. Okay, Representative Costello.
Thank you, um, Mr. Walsh, in I know maybe this is a question for somebody else, but how does a controller know what's in the best interest of an individual? What is the standard for that?
Through the Chair, this is Ian Walsh, Legislative Legal, for the record. To Representative Costello, I think the answer to that question is that it will depend on how the language is ultimately interpreted. I think the best interest of the individual and a number of other of these paragraphs in this duty of loyalty are broadly phrased. And so perhaps the Attorney General might sort of adopt some regulations that would more specifically define what this is and what this isn't. Or if this were ever to be enforced, a court would be tasked with interpreting what would come into this duty.
And so It's sort of like a common law kind of duty in some sense. And what I mean by that is when we think about the common law, we think about reasonableness. And so like negligence, for example, is a concept where people do— one of the prongs of negligence is whether an action is reasonable. And that is open to interpretation. And so courts are tasked with figuring out what the boundaries are.
—Some of these parts of the duty of loyalty would be similar in that regard. Thank you. Thank you. Do you maintain your objection? I thought I removed it, but I remove it again.
Thank you. Objection. Hearing and seeing no other objections, we have adopted Amendment 2. We received 2 amendments from Representative Vance's office. She is not present.
Were any other members planning on offering Representative Vance's amendments? Seeing none, then we are finished with amendments. Um, one moment. Are there any final comments from the sponsor or their staff on House Bill 367?
To me, the bill is really about increasing transparency and protections for Alaskans when it comes to their personal data. Many other states are— have been adopting personal data protection acts, bills, and I think through the chair to the committee, I think this is something This Alaska Data Privacy Act is very important for us to protect our citizens. Thank you, Representative Story, and thanks for bringing the bill forward. Are there any final questions or comments from the committee?
Seeing no further questions or comments, do we have a motion at this time? Mr. Chair, at this time, I move that House Bill 367, Work Order 34-LS1485/G, as amended, be reported out of the House Judiciary Committee with individual recommendations and attached Fiscal Notes. Object. Um, would you like to speak to your objection?
Okay, uh, would the clerk please call the roll? Yes. Representative Kopp is not present. Representative Eyeshide? Yes.
Representative Mina? Yes. Representative Vance is not present. Representative Costello? No.
Representative Underwood? No. Chair Gray? Yes. 3 Yeas and 2 nays.
With a vote of 3 yeas and 2 nays, House Bill 367, Work Order 34-LS1485/G, as in golf, as amended, is reported out of the House Judiciary Committee with individual recommendations and attached fiscal notes. I authorize Legislative Legal Services to make any necessary technical and conforming changes. We will sign the paperwork as soon as we gavel up. Cavill out. Sorry.
That concludes today's business before this committee. Before we adjourn, here is a preview of our— of next week's meetings, our last week. Monday, May 11th, SB 252, UCC Secured Transactions Electronic Records, by Senator Clayman. Wednesday, May 13th, HB 325, Industrial Hemp, by Representative McCabe. And Friday, May 15th, uh, HB 159, Property Possession and Property Crimes, by Representative G. Nelson.
The time is now 2:31 PM, and this hearing of the House Judiciary Committee is adjourned.